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Gender Inequality in Poverty in Affluent Nations: 
The Role of Single Motherhood and the State 
Women have higher poverty rates than men in almost all societies (Casper et 
al. 1994). In this paper, we compare modern nations on this dimension.  We 
use the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) to compare women's and men's 
poverty rates in eight Western industrialized countries circa the early 1990s: 
the United States, Australia, Canada, France, West Germany, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  We define individuals to be 
in poverty if they live in households with incomes below half the median for 
their nation.  We examine, for each country, the ratio of women’s to men’s 
poverty rate.  We then use simple demographic simulation methods to 
estimate how this gender disparity is affected by how prevalent single 
motherhood is, and by state tax and transfer programs that may particularly 
help households headed by women.      
 
Our guiding framework emphasizes a web of interdependencies.  
Individuals rely on others (family members, employers, or the state) to 






other people—as friends, spouses, employees, fellow citizens, or 
neighbors—and in this we are reliant on the labor of those who reared these 
people.  In this second emphasis, our analysis is inspired by feminist 
interrogation of who pays the costs of children (England and Folbre 1999; 
Folbre 1994a; 1994b).  In this view, an important reason that more women 
than men are in poor households is because women are paying more of the 
costs of children than men.  Folbre (1994a) argues that many members of 
society share in the benefits of children being brought up well.  Most of us 
are dependent upon those who rear children for our ability to find caring 
friends, a spouse, trustworthy neighbors, or employees.    But we seldom 
recognize this dependency, and market mechanisms don’t get all the 
beneficiaries to pay the parents or others who reared children.  Often when 
services have this “public good” aspect, as for example with national 
defense or highways, the state steps in to socialize the costs.  Many social 
welfare programs, in effect, socialize some of the costs of rearing children. 
 But states differ in how much they do this, and this may affect how much 
individual mothers bear the costs of children relative to individual fathers, 






the distribution of the costs of children between individual mothers and 
fathers, since in the case of nonmarital births and divorce, individual fathers 
often contribute little or nothing to the labor of rearing children and little to 
the financial costs.  If women are poorer than men because many of them 
are raising children alone, this is evidence that mothers are bearing a 
disproportionate share of the costs of children relative to fathers or other 
citizens.  The prevalence of single mothers and the way they (and others) 
are treated by social policies both affect the sex gap in poverty rates.   
 
Past Literature On Gender Inequality in Poverty Rates 
Individuals get income from three main sources: the family, the market and 
the state.  Households get their money primarily from household members 
selling their labor in labor markets or receiving transfers from government 
programs.
1  Family members generally pool income, so the family serves to 
redistribute income within households, with those who either work for 
earnings or receive government transfers sharing these types of income 







Women have a higher poverty rate than men in almost all nations.  (Sweden 
is the exception among the countries in our sample.)  In thinking about 
possible causes of the gender gap in poverty rates, it is crucial to 
understand that poverty is measured at the household or family level in 
most all government and academic statistics.   An individual is in poverty if 
s/he lives in a household whose total income falls below the poverty line. In 
households with an adult couple, either both partners are in poverty or 
neither is in poverty.  So, if all adults were married to or cohabiting with a 
person of the other sex, there would be no sex gap in poverty.
2  Thus, the 
sex gap in poverty exists because single women are poorer than single men. 
 And for any size of the sex gap among singles, the overall sex gap will be 
larger if a higher proportion of the population is single.   
 
Why are single women’s households poorer than single men's?  There are 
two main reasons--women's lower income and the fact that more single 
women live with children.  Having children in the household affects the 
likelihood of poverty in one definitional way.  Since the poverty line is 






the income necessary for the household to escape poverty, and thus, 
income equal, single adults who live with children are more likely to be poor 
than those who live alone.  Single women are much more likely to live with 
children than single men, since women usually have custody of the children 
in cases of divorce or nonmarital births.  Thus, even if single men and 
women had equal earnings, more of the women than the men would be in 
poverty by virtue of supporting children. 
 
Single women’s greater poverty also comes from their lower earnings.  
Since single individuals typically do not have adult household members to 
transfer income to them, most are reliant on either government transfers or 
earnings.  Although research on the sex gap in pay has seldom examined 
patterns separately by marital status, it is safe to assume that single women 
earn less than single men for many of the same reasons that women earn 
less than men more generally. (For a comparative overview of gender 
inequality in employment in earnings in modern nations, see Gornick 1999.) 
 






forces encourage individuals to seek out sex-typical jobs and because of sex 
discrimination in hiring and job placement by employers (Jacobs 1989; 
Reskin and Roos 1990).  Segregated jobs create a sex gap in pay because, 
even though "female" jobs require as much education, on average, as "male" 
jobs, they pay less (England 1992).  The low pay in “women’s jobs” may 
arise because of crowding, the greater excess of supply relative to demand 
in female jobs than in male jobs, resulting from the exclusion of women 
from "male" jobs (Bergmann 1986).  In addition, there is evidence that sex 
bias affects employers' decisions about how much to pay “women’s jobs” 
relative to jobs dominated by men; this is the type of discrimination at issue 
in "comparable worth" (England 1992; Sorensen 1994). 
 
Parenthood reduces women’s but not men’s pay, also contributing to the 
sex gap in pay. Motherhood lowers the pay of women because some 
women leave the labor force or work part-time when they have children.  In 
the case of single mothers this may require living on government transfer 
payments. When mothers return to work full-time, their earnings suffer 






after adjustments for prior experience, motherhood lowers women’s 
earnings (Budig and England 1999; Waldfogel 1997, 1998).   This may be 
because child care leaves mothers with less energy when they go to work, 
cutting into their productivity, because they trade off higher wages for 
“mother-friendly” jobs,
3 or because employers discriminate against mothers. 
  
 
Nations differ in how their welfare states deal with these issues.  Orloff 
(1993:319) suggests the utility of classifying welfare states along “a general 
dimension of self-determination” that would consider how much the state 
allows individuals to be independent from either markets or marriages.  This 
contrasts with conceptualizations, like Esping-Andersen’s (1990) Marxist-
inspired notion of “decommodification,” which focus on how much 
independence from markets the state provides.  A feminist critique of this 
formulation is that it implicitly assumes that men’s (or women’s) 
dependence on capitalist employers is more problematic than wives’ 
dependence upon husbands for money.  In her discussion of the gendered 






facilitates women’s independence from either employers or husbands.  Her 
work implies that a large sex gap in poverty is not a necessary consequence 
of a high incidence of single mothers.  This is because welfare states can 
ameliorate poverty among single mothers, either through policies that help 
women combine employment with motherhood, through enforcement of 
obligations that noncustodial fathers pay child support, and/or through 
transfer payments that pull single mothers out of poverty. 
 
The thrust of the literature on welfare states is that the U.S. and other 
Anglo-Saxon nations provide less than other nations that facilitates mothers’ 
employment as well as less generous and universal income support.  Nordic 
nations provide the most, with other nations intermediate.  One might infer 
from this that nations in which the welfare state is doing more for women 
(and mothers) have a lower gender gap in poverty.  However, state policies 
are not necessarily the cause of national differences in the gender gap in 
poverty.  In part this is because there are other determinants of women 
having higher poverty than men, such as the proportion of women who are 






sector labor markets.  Also, having relatively generous programs for single 
women (including single mothers) will not necessarily equalize poverty rates 
for women relative to men.  It could be that welfare states that have 
generous policies for single women also have generous policies for single 
men, and therefore that generous welfare states do nothing close the sex 
gap in poverty.    
 
Our goal is to assess the extent to which national differences in the gender 
gap in poverty come from differences in family structure (the proportion of 
people who are single, and whether single women are mothers) and 
governmental transfers more favorable to women versus men. The past 
research that comes closest to addressing our question is that of Casper et 
al. (1994). Using data from the mid-1980s, they showed nations arrayed as 
follows, in descending order of the size of their ratio of women's to men's 
poverty rate.  The U.S., Australia, West Germany, Canada, and the U.K. all 
had a sizeable gender gap.  In Italy and the Netherlands women's poverty 
rate was about the same as men's.  In Sweden, women's poverty rate was 






use a more recent wave of data for each country.  We analyze the same 
countries except that we have added France because it is well known for 
welfare state policies directed at children and excluded Italy.
4  
 
Casper et al. (1994) used logistic regression to predict individuals’ poverty 
from several variables; most describe household composition and one 
dummy variable indicates whether are not individuals are employed.  They 
then performed a decomposition showing that nations with more women 
relative to men living in households with children--which occurs when there 
are more single mothers--have larger sex gaps in poverty.  They found that 
the high levels of employment among single females in Sweden are 
important in reducing women's poverty relative to men's.  They speculate 
that the near equal poverty rates of the Dutch must come from generous 
transfer programs, since they show that the Netherlands has low female 
employment and relatively high rates of single motherhood, both factors that 
would tend to increase women's poverty relative to men's.  
 






nation’s family patterns (e.g. prevalence of single mothers) on the gender 
gap in poverty.  On this question, our contribution is in more detailed 
measures of family status categories and use of more recent data. Their 
analysis did not examine the contribution of the state to men's and women's 
poverty.  Their conclusions that the relatively low gender gap in poverty in 
the Netherlands is explained by welfare policies was largely speculative.  We 
assess this more directly through our simulations that examine each nation’s 
ratio of women’s to men’s poverty including and excluding transfer 
payments, after standardizing poverty rates for demographic differences 
between nations in the proportion of people in various family status 
categories.       
DATA, MEASURES, AND METHOD
We use the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS).  This data set contains 
information on household income for over 25 nations in 90 databases 
covering the period 1967 to 1995, and new waves of data continue to be 
added (LIS User Guide 1998). The LIS consists of a set of household 
income surveys representing the civilian non-institutionalized population of 






from early to mid-1990s. The United States database is the March 1995 
Current Population Survey with annual income information for 1994. The 
other nations we examine are the U.S. (1994), Australia (1994), Canada 
(1994), West Germany (1994), France (1989), Netherlands (1991), Sweden 




In order to avoid including students and retirees, whose poverty is driven by 
very different factors than that of “prime-age” adults, we limited our sample 
to adults from age 25 to 54.  Although our measures of poverty and 
household type are defined at the household level, individual men and 
women are the units of analysis.
 
 
The measure of economic poverty we use here considers an individual in 
poverty if she or he lives in a household with a (size-adjusted) disposable 
money income that is less than half the median for households in the nation. 
This is a relative notion of poverty that compares the economic well being 






countries or to some absolute standard).  We measure poverty at the 
household level.  One limitation of measuring poverty at the household level 
is the implicit assumption of perfect pooling between household members.  
This ignores that an individual who brings money into the household may 
not share perfectly, but may retain disproportionate power over how money 
is spent and may consume more than other family members.  There is a 
strong theoretical and an inconclusive but suggestive empirical literature 
proposing that women may have less decision-making power over how 
money is to be spent and in bargaining over other issues when they are 
dependent on their husbands for money.  (For reviews, see England and 
Kilbourne 1990; Lundberg and Pollak 1996.)  On the other hand, to assume 
no pooling would even more seriously distort individuals’ ability to consume 
and to participate in societies in ways that require money.  The 
nonemployed wife of a corporate executive with extremely high earnings 
would be classified in poverty if we took an individual rather than household 
definition of poverty.  Thus, we think the household definition is preferable, 
as long as we do not forget that those who earn or otherwise receive money 






members.   
 
The forms of income that go into the determination of whether a household 
is in poverty are cash and near-cash income.  LIS data sets contain 
variables for earnings, pensions, many types of government transfers, and 
other sources of income such as property income and child support 
payments.  These were added to form total household income.  We also 
include near-cash transfers such as food stamps
7 and cash denominated 
housing allowances in our definition of household income.  This gross 
income was then converted to “disposable income” by subtracting out 
income and payroll taxes.  For our simulation designed to assess the effect 
of welfare state’s tax and transfer programs on gender inequality in poverty, 
discussed below, we compare ratios of women’s to men’s poverty 
computed using this disposable (post-tax, post-transfer) income to those 
computed using pre-tax, pre-transfer income.  (For both we take the 
poverty line to be half of median disposable income.)  Even post-transfer 
income excludes non-cash benefits such as health care, child care, and 







Before comparing a household’s income to the poverty line for the relevant 
nation to determine whether the household is in poverty, income was 
adjusted by a commonly used equivalence scale.  (The U.S. governmental 
poverty line, which we do not use, is also constructed with an equivalence 
scale.)  Equivalence scales adjust income for family size.  However, instead 
of a simple linear transformation like per capita income, they are calibrated 
to reflect the notion that while a larger family needs more income than a 
smaller family, given economies of scale, a family of four doesn’t need 
twice of what a family of two needs. Details on our choice of an 
equivalence scale are in the Appendix.  The Appendix also includes 
calculations showing that our basic substantive conclusions are fairly robust 
regardless of whether our measure of family size weights each adult and 
child as 1, or weights children 25% more or less than adults.  The former 
assumes that households need more money per child than per adult because 
children need child care, while the latter assumes children consume less of 







To assess how much between-nation differences in household composition 
affect the degree of gender inequality in poverty, we perform a simple 
demographic simulation making use of post-tax, post-transfer (disposable) 
income.  To do this, we first classify the individual women and men who 
are our units of analysis by the household type they live in, i.e. whether they 
are part of a male-female couple or not and by the presence of absence of 
children under age 18 in the household.  As shorthand, we will refer to both 
married and cohabiting male-female couples as “married.”
8  Whether 
individuals are classified as “parents” is determined not by whether they 
have biological children, but by whether a child under 18 lives in their 
household.  So, for example, single fathers who do not live with their 
children are classified as male single non-parents.   This yields four 
household types for each sex: married parents, married non-parents, single 
parents, and single non-parents. The overall poverty rate for women is a 
weighted average of the poverty rate for women in each of the four 
household-type categories, and analogously for men. 
 






women. The measure of the gender gap in poverty that we use is the ratio 
of women’s poverty rate to men’s poverty rates, called the “sex-poverty 
ratio.” (We take this term from McLanahan et al. 1989.) We also examine 
these ratios for subgroups such as singles and single parents.   
 
We then move to simulations designed to assess the effects of welfare state 
tax and transfer policies, and the effects of household composition on 
cross-national differences in gender inequality in poverty.  First, to assess 
the effects of tax and transfer policies, we compare the sex-poverty ratio if 
income is pre-tax and pre-transfer to the sex-poverty ratio if it is post-tax 
and post-transfer.  If we are willing to assume no behavioral response (in 
labor supply, marriage, cohabitation, or fertility) to policies, this tells us 
whether overall the tax and transfer policies help women or men more, as 
regards being or not being in poverty.   
 
Second, we assess the effects of family composition on nations’ 
sex-poverty ratio by performing a simulation that gives every other nation 






the nation’s own poverty rates within household types.  In essence, we 
weight a country’s sex- and household-type-specific poverty rates by U.S. 
weights for family demography.  This gives us the sex-poverty ratios other 
nations would have if they had the U.S. household composition.    
 
RESULTS 
Table 1 shows the raw sex gap in poverty in various subgroups.  The first 
two columns examine poverty rates among all men and women ages 25-54 
and the third shows the “sex-poverty ratio,” i.e. women's poverty rates 
divided by men's poverty rates.    
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE.] 
 
Looking at the poverty rates, we see that men in Sweden and the 
Netherlands have substantially lower poverty rates than men in the other 
countries (under 5%), while U.S. and Canadian men have the highest 
poverty rates (11%).   The rank order of countries by women’s poverty 
rates is the same, with the lowest women’s poverty in Sweden (3%) and 






(15%).   
 
Only Sweden has a sex-poverty ratio less than one, indicating that Swedish 
men are more likely to live in poverty than Swedish women.   But both 
sexes have very low poverty, so the difference is not large in percentage 
point terms (4% for men and 3% for women).  In all other countries, 
women have higher poverty rates then men; the country with the next 
lowest sex-poverty ratio is France, where women are 11% more likely than 
men to live in poverty.  Sex-poverty ratios are higher than this in Canada, 
the Netherlands, Germany and U.K., where women are between 13% and 
20% more likely to live in poverty than men.  The two outliers are Australia 
and the U.S., where women are respectively 30% and 38% more likely to 
live in poverty than men.   
 
Table 1 also shows poverty rates and ratios for single men and women.  We 
examine singles separately because the overall gender gap in poverty is 
driven entirely by the gap among singles, weighted by what proportion of 






men’s poverty rates are quite similar to the ranking for all (single and 
married) men.  The same holds for single women.  The low poverty of 
single women in Sweden (5%) is striking.  Even single men in all countries 
have higher poverty rates, and the poverty rates of single women in other 
countries are in an entirely different ballpark than that of their Swedish 
counterparts, from 13% in the Netherlands to a high of 32% in the U.S.  In 
all countries but Sweden, single women have higher poverty than single 
men.  In all countries but Sweden and France, single women’s poverty is 
more than 50% higher than men’s.   
 
Table 1 also shows the poverty rates for single mothers.  Swedish single 
mothers are outliers with a poverty rate of only 3%.  Rates of poverty for 
single mothers are very high in all other countries, from a low of 25% in 
France and the Netherlands to a high of 47% in the U.S.  Single fathers 
have poverty rates lower than single mothers, but quite high in the 10-30% 
range except for the low 7% rate of Sweden.
9 
 






rate is higher than men’s everywhere except Sweden.  However,  there are 
large national differences in the extent of inequality between women’s and 
men’s rates of poverty.  Single women, particularly single mothers, have 
higher poverty rates than most other groups of men or women in all nations 
but Sweden.  But the extent to which single women and single mothers 
have “surplus” poverty varies by nation. 
 
Next we want to assess how much differences between nations in their 
sex-poverty ratio are driven by differences in their tax and transfer policies, 
and how much by the prevalence of single motherhood.  To do this, we 
perform data-based simulations, presented in Table 2. 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE.] 
 
First, we want to assess whether, all in all, tax and transfer payment 
policies help reduce women’s poverty relative to men’s.  That is, we want 
to know if they change the ratio of women’s poverty rate to men’s.  For 
that to be true, the policies would have to raise proportionately more women 






hypothetical poverty rates for women and men in each nation based on their 
income before subtracting taxes and before adding government transfers.  
The ratio of women’s to men’s poverty in the first row of Table 2 comes 
from these calculations.  It can be compared to the second row in Table 2, 
which gives the sex-poverty ratio when each household’s actual disposable 
(post-tax, post-transfer) income is used.  
 
Table 2 shows that in all cases the actual ratio of women's to men's poverty 
is lower than it is before taxes and transfers, implying that every nation’s 
welfare state pulls proportionately more single women than single men out 
of poverty. However, in most nations the reductions are very small.  If we 
count any reduction less than 5% as trivial, then the welfare states of the 
U.S., Canada, France, and Germany are not redistributive between men and 
women, at least across the poverty line.  They reduce the sex-poverty ratios 
by 3, 2, 1, and 1% respectively.  The tax and transfer systems of Australia 
and the U.K. are slightly more friendly to women relative to men as regards 
poverty; they reduce the sex-poverty ratio by 5% and 8% respectively.  The 






most, relative to men, are the Netherlands and Sweden, whose systems 
reduce the ratio of women's to men's poverty by 15% and 21% respectively 
(Table 2). Thus, the fact that the U.S. has the highest ratio of women's 
poverty to men's poverty can be attributed in part to its less gender-
redistributive system of tax and transfer policies as regards poverty.  This is 
particularly true in comparison with the Netherlands and Sweden.   
 
The two nations whose welfare states reduce the gender gap in poverty the 
most, Sweden and the Netherlands, also have the lowest poverty rates of 
both men and women.  However, the Netherlands has much higher poverty 
of single mothers (25%, similar to that of France) than Sweden (3%).  The 
policies of most of the nations are scarcely redistributive across gender 
lines.  Some nations, like France and Germany, may have relatively 
generous welfare systems compared to the U.S., but because they help men 
nearly as much as women, they scarcely reduce the gender inequality in 
poverty produced by family and market.   
 






ratio of women’s to men’s poverty.  To do this, we can standardize any 
nation’s poverty rates to the demography of any other.  To avoid too many 
comparisons, and because the U.S. has the worst sex gap in poverty, we 
use the U.S. as a comparator.  The fourth row of Table 2 gives the 
hypothetical ratio of women’s to men’s poverty for each nation if it were 
given the family demography of the U.S.  
 
To calculate this, we first divide the individuals in each nation into eight sex-
specific household types.  That is, we divide each sex into married parents, 
married non-parents, single parents, and single non-parents.  The U.S. 
poverty rate for each of these groups is computed from the LIS U.S. data.  
Then we create hypothetical male and female poverty rates for the other 
nations under the assumption that they had the U.S. family demography.  
To do this, for each sex, in each nation, we take a weighted average of that 
nation’s observed poverty rates.  If we used that nation’s proportion of 
persons of that sex who are in that household category, we would get the 
nation’s observed (disposable, i.e. post-tax, post-transfer) poverty rate.  






the poverty rate the nation would have if it had U.S. family demography.  
The sex-poverty ratios corresponding to these hypothetical rates are row 4 
of Table 2.  By comparing them to row 2, the nation’s actual post-transfer, 
post-tax ratios, we see how much their gender inequality in poverty would 
be increased if they had the U.S. family demography.  Close examination of 
the detailed numbers leading to these rates and ratios makes clear that it is 
largely the U.S. higher proportion of single mothers that drives the 
differences between the sex-poverty ratios with the nation’s own versus the 
U.S. family demography (row 2 versus row 4 in Table 2).  The last row of 
Table 2 gives the percent by which the sex-poverty ratio is increased when 
each nation is given the U.S. family demography (as weights) but keeps its 
own poverty rates within household types. 
 
The last rows of Table 2 show that every nation would have a higher ratio 
of women’s to men’s poverty if they had the U.S. household family 
composition.  This is largely due to the high percentage of U.S. women 
who are single mothers, about 12%.  In Sweden, France, Germany, and the 






nations have higher rates with Australia at 8%, Canada at 9%, the U.K. at 
11%, and the U.S. the highest at 12%.  We see that, given that the U.K. has 
nearly as many single mothers as the U.S., if they had the U.S. family 
demography their sex-poverty ratio would go up only 3%.  But the ratios of 
Australia, Canada, France, and Sweden would all go up 7-8%.  The ratios 
for Germany would go up 19% and the Netherlands would go up 30%.   
Despite the fact that Germany and the Netherlands have about the same 
proportion of single mothers as France and Sweden, the ratio of women’s 
to men’s poverty would go up much more in the former than the latter two 
nations if they had the U.S. family composition.  This is largely because 
single mothers have higher poverty relative to single men in Germany and 
the Netherlands than in France and Sweden.    
 
CONCLUSION 
Women have higher poverty than men in every nation besides Sweden.  
However, the ratio of women’s poverty to men’s among the nonelderly 
differs by nation, being highest in the U.S. (1.38), followed by Australia 






family demography as they affect these sex-poverty ratios and how they 
differ across nations.   
 
To assess how nations’ welfare states affect gender inequality in poverty, 
we compared the hypothetical sex-poverty ratios if the state did no taxation 
and transfers (that is the ratios calculated from pre-transfer, pre-tax 
income) to the actual ratios (calculated on disposable, i.e. post-transfer, 
post-tax income).  Systems of taxation and transfer payments are the major 
way that welfare states affect the distribution of income.  While our analysis 
does not consider the effects of specific programs, it provides a good 
“bottom line” assessment of whether tax and transfer systems bring 
proportionately more women or men out of (or into) poverty.   The U.S., 
Australia, Canada, France, and Germany all reduce the ratio of women’s to 
men’s poverty rates by 5% or less through their tax and transfer systems. 
Thus, in these countries the welfare state does little to reduce the gender 
inequality in poverty produced by single motherhood and labor market 
inequalities.  The UK reduces its sex-poverty ratio from 1.30 to 1.20, by 






the most for women relative to men are the Netherlands and Sweden.  In 
Sweden, women have no higher poverty than men even when we look at 
pre-tax, pre-transfer income, but after taxes and transfers are included in 
income, women’s poverty goes down even more relative to men’s.     
 
One might object to our analysis because it embodies the unrealistic 
assumption that there are no behavioral effects of welfare, such as women 
deciding not to be employed or not to get married because of the availability 
of transfers for single mothers.  However, if such behavioral effects exist, 
and particularly affect women, then our analysis will exaggerate the 
beneficial effects of transfers on women’s poverty rates relative to men’s.  
If this is true, we may be exaggerating the helpful effect of the state on 
gender equality in freedom from poverty in Sweden and Netherlands.  But 
the conclusion seems quite safe that the welfare states of the other five 
nations (the U.S., Australia, Canada, France, and Germany) make no more 
than trivial redistribution that reduces the gender disparity in poverty rates.  







Our analysis also examined the effect of household demography on gender 
inequality in poverty.  Poverty, as we measure it, applies to all members of a 
household, so married couples can’t contribute to a sex gap in poverty, and 
any gap must come all from disparities between single men and women.  In 
particular, single mothers have higher poverty than other groups 
everywhere but Sweden (although the extent of their surplus rates varies).  
Single women are more likely to be supporting children than single men, yet 
have lower earnings on average.  Thus, nations with a higher percent of 
women who are single mothers will generally have a higher sex gap in 
poverty.  We examined how much household composition drives 
differences between nations in the degree of sex inequality in poverty. To 
do this, we compared the actual sex-poverty ratios to those each nation 
would have if it had the proportion of men and women in each household 
category (single with kids, single without kids, married with kids, and 
married without kids) that the U.S. has.  This simulation showed that every 
nation would have more gender inequality in poverty if it had U.S. family 
demography.  The major factor in the increase is the higher proportion of 






Australia, Germany and the Netherlands are such that if they had U.S. 
demography but their own poverty rates within household types they would 
have higher gender inequality in poverty than the U.S.  
 
Sweden is doubly blessed, with family demography and the state 
contributing to women’s low poverty relative to men’s.  Even if single 
mothers did have higher poverty than other groups in Sweden, its lower 
proportion of single mothers relative to the U.S. would give it a lower ratio 
of women’s to men’s poverty than in the U.S.  Its welfare state is also 
important to gender equality, as seen by the fact that taxes and transfers 
reduce the ratio of women’s poverty to men’s below its already low level.    
 
France is also known for its ample government transfers and services for 
families with children.  We thought at first that this must be what produced 
its relatively low poverty rates among single mothers and low sex-poverty 
ratio among singles (Table 1).  However, our simulations make clear that 
state transfers of income are not what generates France’s greater gender 






gender disparity in poverty in either France or the U.S.  Apparently the 
French system is more generous to both men and women, while the U.S. 
system is stingy to both, but neither does much redistribution by gender.  
The superiority of France to the U.S. in gender equality in poverty comes in 
part from its lower prevalence of single mothers. 
 
The Netherlands is a particularly interesting case with forces pulling for and 
against gender equality in poverty.  Dutch single mothers have very high 
poverty rates.  Before taxes and transfers the Dutch sex-poverty ratio is as 
high as any nation but the U.S. and Australia, in part because all mothers, 
single and married, have low employment rates.  But the Netherlands has 
fewer single mothers than the U.S. or other Anglo-Saxon nations, which 
lowers their gender inequality in poverty.  Their tax and transfer system also 
works against gender inequality in poverty more than that of any nation 
besides Sweden. 
 
If Sweden is doubly blessed, the U.S. is “doubly damned,” with high levels 






redistributes little if at all by gender.  Both the high rates of single 
motherhood and the lack of gender redistribution by the welfare state 
contribute to the highest gender disparity in poverty.  It is important to 
remember that the income data used here exclude noncash transfers, such 
as health care and child care.  Analyses that included these would make the 
U.S. look even worse relative to other nations in poverty rates and gender 
inequality in poverty.  All other affluent nations have universally available 
health care and more state child care funding than the U.S.     Universally 
available health care and child care are particularly beneficial to single 
mothers for their direct benefits, as well as because they make employment 
pay where it otherwise would not because of child care costs and loss of 
welfare-provided health care for children.     
 
Single motherhood is growing in most industrial nations.  As this occurs, 
gender inequality in poverty will increase if women’s employment and 
earnings and/or state subsidization of the costs of rearing children do not 
increase to compensate for women’s loss of access to men’s earnings.  






gender equity in bearing the costs of children, and also because the higher 








1.  Some individuals also receive market income from property--dividends 
from stock, rents from real estate, etc., although this affects a fairly 
small proportion of households in modern nations.  Pensions received 
later in life are a delayed payment for work in labor markets, so we 
consider them as part of an individual’s own market earnings.  Self-
employment earnings mix a return to labor and capital, but we consider 
them together with labor earnings. 
2.  U.S. government poverty statistics consider cohabiting unmarried 
couples as if they were two households.  Following the convention of 
most other governments, in this paper, we will consider cohabiting 
different-sex couples and married couples together, referring to them as 
married.  This reflects the assumption that cohabiting couples generally 
pool income. 
3.  A recent analysis by Budig and England (1999) casts doubt on the 
hypothesis that the motherhood penalty arises because mothers trade 






occupational characteristics and dummy variables for industry into a 
regression predicting women’s earnings showed that the presence or 
absence of these controls had no effect on the size of the coefficient 
measuring the effect of number of children on wages.  
4.  We omitted Italy because a few anomalies in the most recent wave of 
data require correction. 
5.  The LIS databases for the other nations are:  Australia 1994 (Housing 
and Income Survey), Canada 1994 (Survey of Consumer Finances), 
France 1989 (Enquete Bourgeois, or Budget Survey), West Germany 
1994 (German Social and Economic Panel), Netherlands 1991 (Income 
Distribution Survey), Sweden 1992 (Household Income Distribution 
Survey), and the United Kingdom 1995 Family Expenditure Survey). 
Each national database is sent to LIS in its cleaned and edited form.  At 
LIS, the data are harmonized by reclassifying the income and 
demographic variables into homogeneous types of income and 
family/household characteristics.  These consistently defined income 
and household types allow the researcher to carry out analysis of a 






6.  We only include individuals whom LIS classified as heads of 
households or the spouses or cohabitants of heads.  Single adults living 
alone or with children were classified as heads, and one person in each 
different-sex couple was called the head (with decision rules varying by 
country).  Thus, the individuals who are omitted from our analysis are 
adults who are neither a single head nor part of a married or cohabiting 
different-sex couple.  For example, if a single or married mother lives 
with her mother, the grandmother is not a unit in our analysis.  
However, any income provided by these extra adults is included in our 
measure of household income, and the presence of the adult is taken 
account of when the equivalence index is used to size-standardize the 
household’s income before determining if it is in poverty. 
7.  In including food stamps, our procedure differs from the U.S. 
government poverty series, which excludes food stamps income before 
determining if it is in poverty. 
8.  Only the data from the Netherlands identified same-sex couples; we did 
not include them in our analysis since no other nations’ data sets allow 






9.  Caution is needed interpreting rates for single fathers, as the data sets in 
many countries have quite small sample sizes of single fathers, 
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Table 1: Poverty Rates
1 and Sex-Poverty Ratios for All Adults, Single 
Adults, and Single Mothers and Fathers 






































































                         
 AS 94    0.082  0.107  1.30    0.148  0.247  1.67    0.386  0.275  2.60  1.40 
CN 94    0.116  0.131  1.13   0.174  0.291  1.68   0.405  0.171  2.33  2.37 
FR 89    0.096  0.107  1.11   0.132  0.164  1.24   0.247  0.111  1.87  2.23 
GE 94    0.083  0.098  1.18   0.118  0.226  1.92   0.391  0.111  3.31  3.52 
NL 91    0.049  0.056  1.14   0.081  0.132  1.63   0.257  0.000  3.17  NA4 
 SW 92    0.040  0.029  0.73    0.093  0.048  0.52    0.034  0.069  0.37  0.49 
UK 95    0.091  0.109  1.20   0.136  0.214  1.57   0.319  0.200  2.35  1.60 
US 94    0.110  0.151  1.38   0.166  0.320  1.93   0.471  0.223  2.84  2.11 
 
1Poverty rates are the proportion of non-elderly adults ages 25-54 whose disposable 
family incomes fall below the poverty line.  “Single” means not married or part of a 
cohabiting male/female couple.   
2The sex-poverty ratio is the female poverty rate divided by the male poverty rate. 
3Single fathers are men living with a child under the age of 18 and without an adult female. 
 Single mothers are defined analogously.  Single fathers’ rates should be interpreted with 
caution because some Ns are < 30. 
4This ratio cannot be computed since the denominator is 0. 
 
Note:  AS=Australia, CN=Canada; FR=France; GE=Germany; NL=the Netherlands; 






Table 2: Ratio of Women’s to Men’s Poverty Rate in Eight Nations 
and Under Simulations  
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Note:  The first row gives the ratio of women’s to men’s poverty rates for each country 
when we do not add government transfers to or subtract payroll taxes from income.  The 
second row gives the ratio of women’s to men’s poverty rate for  disposable income 
(post-transfer, post-tax).  The third row gives the percentage change in the ratio of 
women’s to men’s poverty rate due to the nation’s tax and transfer system (i.e. the 
percentage change between row 1 and 2).  Using disposable (post-transfer, post-tax) 
income, the fourth row gives the ratio of women’s to men’s poverty rate each nation 
would have if it kept its own poverty rates for men and women within each household 
type, but had the proportion of men and women in each household type observed in the 
U.S.  The last row gives the percentage change between rows 2 and 4.  This is the 
percentage by which the sex-poverty ratio for disposable income would be increased if 
the nation had the U.S. distribution of people across household types, but kept its own 
sex-specific poverty rates within each household type.    
 







AS=Australia, CN=Canada; FR=France; GE=Germany; NL=the Netherlands; 







Appendix on Equivalence Scales to Adjust for Family Size 
Equivalence scales adjust the poverty line for family size.  Buhmann et al. 
(1988) propose that income be adjusted for family size in the following way: 
Adjusted Income = Disposable Income/Size
E 
 
The equivalence elasticity, E, varies between 0 and 1.  The smaller the E, 
the larger the economies of scale assumed by the equivalence scale.  An E 
of 0 makes no size adjustment;  the poverty line is the same regardless of 
family size.  With an E of 1, adjusted income becomes per capita income 
(with no economies of scale).  We use an equivalence scale of .5, as this is 
the middle ground between no adjustment for size and per capita income, 
and this figure is commonly used in cross-national poverty research.     The 
official poverty rate used by the U.S. government is based on an 
equivalence scale of .56, but produces similar poverty rates to the 
equivalence scale of .5. 
 
A separate issue is how adults are to be weighted relative to children.  The 
simplest procedure, which we use in Tables 1 and 2, weights both adults 






argue that children should be weighted less because they consume less of 
some goods, for example food, and thus a family needs less income for an 
additional child than an additional adult.  On the other hand, children need 
intensive care that adults do not.  This care is paid for by families (or the 
state) either in cash for childcare or in the opportunity cost of a family 
member’s time spent caring for children rather than earning a wage.  To 
test how sensitive our conclusions are to the relative weight given to 
children and adults, Table A-1 presents the results in Table 2 (bolded) and 
compares them to results when children are weighted .75 (top number in 
each cell) and 1.25 (lower number in each cell).  In all cases adults are 
weighted 1 and E=.5. 
 
An examination of Table A-1 suggests that how children are weighted 
changes numbers somewhat, but our basic conclusions are unchanged, and 






Appendix Table A-1. Ratio of Women’s to Men’s Poverty Rate 
in Eight Nations and Under Simulations, Using an Equivalence 
Scale in Which Children are Weighted .75, 1, and 1.25 that of 
Adults    
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Note:  The first number in each cell is the ratio when children are weighted .75 in the equivalence scale, the 
second when weighted 1 (bolded numbers are those in Table 2), and the third when weighted 1.25.  See 
Appendix for description of equivalence scale. 
 
Note:  The first row gives the ratio of women’s to men’s poverty rates for each country when we do not 
add government transfers to or subtract payroll taxes from income.  The second row gives the ratio of 
women’s to men’s poverty rate for disposable income (post-transfer, post-tax).  The third row gives the 
percentage change in the ratio of women’s to men’s poverty rate due to the nation’s tax and transfer system 
(i.e. the percentage change between row 1 and 2).  Using disposable (post-transfer, post-tax) income, the 
fourth row gives the ratio of women’s to men’s poverty rate each nation would have if it kept its own 
poverty rates for men and women within each household type, but had the proportion of men and women in 
each household type observed in the U.S.  The last row gives the percentage change between rows 2 and 4. 
 This is the percentage by which the sex-poverty ratio for disposable income would be increased if the 
nation had the U.S. distribution of people across household types, but kept its own sex-specific poverty 
rates within each household type.    
 
AS=Australia, CN=Canada; FR=France; GE=Germany; NL=the 
Netherlands; SW=Sweden; UK=United Kingdom; US=United States. 